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Why Is Virtual Reality Interesting for
Philosophers?
Thomas K. Metzinger 1,2*
1 Philosophisches Seminar, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Germany, 2 Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies,
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
This article explores promising points of contact between philosophy and the expanding
field of virtual reality research. Aiming at an interdisciplinary audience, it proposes a
series of new research targets by presenting a range of concrete examples characterized
by high theoretical relevance and heuristic fecundity. Among these examples are
conscious experience itself, “Bayesian” and social VR, amnestic re-embodiment,
merging human-controlled avatars and virtual agents, virtual ego-dissolution, controlling
the reality/virtuality continuum, the confluence of VR and artificial intelligence (AI) as
well as of VR and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), VR-based social
hallucinations and the emergence of a virtual Lebenswelt, religious faith and practical
phenomenology. Hopefully, these examples can serve as first proposals for intensified
future interaction and mark out some potential new directions for research.
Keywords: virtual reality, augmented reality, mixed reality, emptiness, philosophy of religion, life-world, social
hallucinations, consciousness
“Virtual reality encompasses virtual unreality” (Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2016, p.38).
INTRODUCTION
What are the most promising future directions for an intensified cooperation between the
philosophical community and virtual reality research (VR), potentially also including other
disciplines like cognitive neuroscience or experimental psychology? The purpose of this
contribution is to take a fresh look, from a philosopher’s perspective, at some specific research
areas in the field of VR, isolating and highlighting aspects of particular interest from a conceptual
and metatheoretical perspective. This article is intended as a source of inspiration for an
interdisciplinary audience; if each reader finds just one of the ideas presented below useful, it
will have served its purpose. Hence the article was not written as a technical contribution by
one philosopher for other philosophers and is not meant as an exhaustive list of philosophical
research targets. I simply draw attention to a selection of topics that are, I believe, characterized
by an exceptionally high degree of heuristic fecundity. To make these issues accessible to an
interdisciplinary readership, I will briefly introduce some central concepts as I go (see Box 1),
and sometimes use a more essayistic style. The hope is that these topics, deliberately presented
along with a series of concrete examples, can serve as contact points between both disciplines and
mark out promising subfields in which VR researchers and the philosophical community could
profit from intensified future interaction. I will briefly highlight the theoretical relevance of most
examples, along with the potential future benefits of intensified cooperation. Sometimes, I will also
try to sketch a specific technological realization that would interestingly constrain philosophical
theory formation, open new routes, or constitute the “perfect” or “maximal” VR-experience in a
given context.
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Box 1 | Philosophical concepts.
Amnestic re-embodiment
Re-embodiment of the subject of experience in VR without the conscious knowledge that one is currently immersed in a virtual environment and identified with a
virtual body or character.
Counterfactual content
A linguistic statement or a mental representation has counterfactual content if it contradicts the current state of reality. Thought experiments, conscious experiences,
and most computer-generated models of reality are counterfactual in this sense, because they do not represent or reflect the actual, current state of the world. In
some cases, they may simply be classified as “false” or “misrepresentational,” in other cases they may be adequate, for example if they target a possible, but highly
likely perceptual situation.
Epistemic agent model (EAM)
A conscious internal model of the self as actively selecting targets of knowledge, as an agent that stands in epistemic relations (like “perceiving,” “believing,” “knowing”)
to the world and to itself (as in “controlling the focus of attention,” “reasoning” or “knowing that one knows”), and as an entity that has the capacity to actively create
such relations of knowing. Human beings only have an EAM intermittently, for about one third of their conscious life-time (Metzinger, 2013b, Metzinger, 2015 section
2.5, in Metzinger, 2017). Today’s virtual agents and robots are not yet driven by an internal EAM.
Epistemic innocence
The theory that certain mental processes such as delusion and confabulation (which may count as suboptimal from an epistemological perspective) can have epistemic
benefits. The idea is that in some cases, what superficially appears as an imperfect cognitive process may really enable knowledge acquisition.
Epistemology
The study of knowledge that seeks to answer questions like: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for saying that one possess knowledge? What makes
a belief a justified belief? How many different kinds of knowledge are there? Is there anything like certainty?
Global neural correlate of consciousness (GNCC)
The minimally sufficient set of neurofunctional properties that brings about the conscious model of reality as a whole at a given point in time.
Global transparency
Phenomenal transparency for a whole conscious model of reality.
Hybrid avatar/virtual agent systems (HAVAS)
Digital representations of persons and/or epistemic agents which are simultaneously human-controlled and AI-controlled.
Justified true belief
According to one traditional philosophical model, three individually necessary conditions (namely, truth, belief, and justification) are jointly sufficient for a subject S to
possess knowledge: S knows that p if and only if p is true and S is justified in believing that p.
Lebenswelt (life-world)
A pre-given social world in which subjects experience themselves as being united by a quality of “togetherness.” A Lebenswelt is intersubjectively given and is actively
constituted by everyday social interactions leading to a shared first-person plural perspective (a more or less implicit group context, a mentally represented “we”).
Ontology
In philosophy, the investigation of what there is, i.e., of what entities exist and what the most general features and relations of those entities are (for example, physical
objects, God, universals, numbers, etc.). In computer and information science, the representation, formal naming, and definition of entities and relations substantiating
a domain.
Other-minds illusion
The conscious experience of currently interacting with a system that has mental states when it really has none, for example the (hallucinatory) experience of
encountering another self-conscious entity that actively selects targets of knowledge or is really “perceiving,” “believing,” “knowing” in a way that is relevantly similar
to the observer. An other-minds illusion is a social hallucination.
Other-minds problem
The epistemological problem of gaining knowledge about another entity’s mental states, for example the subjectively felt character of its conscious experiences or
the content of its beliefs.
Phenomenal transparency
Transparency as used in this article is a property of conscious representations; unconscious representations in the human brain are neither transparent nor opaque.
“Transparency” means that only the content of a representation is available for introspective access; the earlier processing stages or aspects of the construction
process are hidden. Therefore, the content cannot be subjectively experienced as a representation. This leads to the phenomenology of “direct realism,” a subjective
experience of immediacy and realness, as if, for example, directly perceiving mind-independent objects.
Phenomenal unit of identification (UI)
The conscious content that is referred to in phenomenological reports of the type “I am this!” (see section Example 2: Embodiment and Bodily Self-Consciousness,
for a definition cf. Metzinger, 2018a).
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Box 1 | Continued
Postbiotic social boot-strapping scenario (PSBS)
A scenario in which multiple AIs create a non-biological Lebenswelt by mutually interacting with each other using virtual agents based on transparent, VR-based
personoid interfaces, thereby causing robust other-minds illusions in each other. Such systems would apply the algorithms they originally developed in man-machine
interactions to machine-machine communication, while still using individual virtual avatars or agent-models as their interfaces.
rt-fMRI-NCCF
A real-time fMRI representation of the global NCC that is directly converted into a virtual reality environment. This would create a perceivable dynamic landscape
which the conscious subject can directly experience, navigate, and causally influence via multiple real-time neurofeedback loops.
Second-order virtual agent
A machine-controlled virtual character or person-model that transparently represents itself as socially situated, i.e., that has an internal model of itself as standing in
genuine social relations to other persons or other self-conscious agents. A second-order agent has an inbuilt other-minds illusion.
Social hallucination
See other-minds illusion.
Synthetic phenomenology (SP)
Artificial conscious experience realized on non-biological carrier systems.
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Empirically informed philosophy ofmind is, rather obviously, the
area within philosophy that can most directly profit from recent
results in VR research. The VR community should also actively
seek more productive input from philosophers of mind. I will
confine myself to two examples.
Example 1: Consciousness
The richest, maximally robust, and close-to-perfect VR-
experience we currently know is our very own, ordinary,
biologically evolved form of waking consciousness itself. VR
is the best technological metaphor for conscious experience
we currently have. The history of philosophy has shown how
technological metaphors for the human mind always have their
limitations: Think of the mechanical clock, the camera, the
steam engine, or, more recently, the computer as a physically
realized abstract automaton, with psychological properties as
exhaustively described by a Turing machine table (Putnam,
1967, 1975, 1992; Churchland, 2005; Boden, 2006). All these
metaphors have severe limitations. Using the computer example,
the classical-cognitivist metaphor of a von-Neuman-machine
cannot accommodate dynamical embodiment, subsymbolic
representation, non-rule based types of information processing,
or the experiential character of phenomenal states as subjectively
experienced from a first-person perspective. Nevertheless, it
is hard to underestimate the influence and impact the long-
abandoned “computer model of mind” has had on modern
analytic philosophy of mind. Technological metaphors often
possess great heuristic fecundity and help us in developing
new ideas and testable hypotheses. Indeed, the computer
model of mind has led to the emergence of a whole new
academic discipline: classical cognitive science. Similarly, I
believe that the heuristic potential of the VR metaphor for
philosophical theories of consciousness has just barely been
grasped.
Some philosophers (Metzinger, 1991, p. 127; Metzinger, 1993,
p. 243; Metzinger, 2003a, 2010, p. 6; Revonsuo, 1995, p. 55;
Revonsuo, 2006, p. 115; Noë, 2002; cf. Clowes and Chrisley, 2012;
Westerhoff, 2016, for critical discussion and recent overviews)
have already argued at length that the conscious experience
produced by biological nervous systems is a virtual model of
the world—a dynamic internal simulation. In standard situations
it cannot be experienced as a virtual model because it is
phenomenally transparent—we “look through it” as if we were
in direct and immediate contact with reality (Moore, 1903;
Metzinger, 2003b; for the notion of “phenomenal transparency”
and a brief explanation of other philosophical concepts see
Box 1). Likewise, technological VR is the representation of
possible worlds and possible selves, with the aim of making
them appear ever more realistic—ideally, by creating a subjective
sense of “presence” in the user. “Presence” is a complex
phenomenal quality, the three major dimensions of which are
identification (i.e., being present as a self ), self-location in a
temporal frame of reference (i.e., being present as a self now, in
this very moment), and self-location in space (i.e., the classical
“place illusion,” Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2016). “Presence” is a
phenomenal quality normally going along with a minimal sense
of selfhood (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009), and it results from
the simulation of a self-centered world—in VR settings as well
as in everyday life. Interestingly, some of our best theories of
the human mind and conscious experience itself use a similar
explanation: Leading current theories of brain dynamics (Friston,
2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016; Metzinger and Wiese, 2017)
describe it as the constant creation of hierarchical internalmodels
of the world, virtual neural representations of reality which
express probability density functions and work by continuously
generating hypotheses about the hidden causes of sensory input,
minimizing their prediction error (see Wiese and Metzinger,
2017 for an accessible introduction). The parallels between
virtuality and phenomenality are striking. Here are some points
of contact between VR and philosophical phenomenology:
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• Phenomenal content and virtual content are both
counterfactual.
Our best current theories of consciousness describe it as
something that could be called a form of “online dreaming”
(Metzinger, 2003a, p. 140), in which conscious waking is
a dreamlike state currently modulated by the constraints
produced by ongoing sensory input. It is a controlled
hallucination based on predictions about the current sensory
input (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016; Wiese and Metzinger,
2017). Relative to the actual state of the world, if taken
as referring to this state, all predictive representations are
non-veridical. Strictly speaking they are misrepresentations—
but are nevertheless potentially beneficial for the system in
which they occur (Wiese, 2017). VR content is typically
part of an animated computer graphics model, and if taken
as depicting the actual physical 3D scene surrounding the
user, it is also a misrepresentation. However, VR content
does not result from a design flaw—the whole point is to
generate perceptual representations of possible worlds in the
user’s brain, not of the actual one. Phenomenal content (the
brain-based content of conscious, subjective experience) is
the content of an ongoing simulation too: a prediction of
the probable causes of a sensory signal. It is not a veridical
representation of the actual environment, and it is useful
for precisely this reason. By definition, machine-generated
virtual content is counterfactual (see Box 1) as well, although
it may be interestingly blended with real-world elements, as in
augmented reality (AR) setups.
If this first point is correct, then it would be interesting
to create VR utilizing the same mechanisms the human
brain uses. What if, for example, in dynamically updating
itself, the animated computer graphics model used the same
computational principles of top-down processing, statistical
estimation, prediction error minimization, hierarchical Bayesian
inference, and predictive control many theoreticians now believe
to be operative in the brain itself? Would this change the
user’s phenomenology in any interesting way, for example its
fine-grained temporal dynamics? This is one example of a
new research question that is interesting from a philosophical
perspective, but which also has implications for making the
VR experience better. It should therefore be of interest to
people in the field and it could be tackled with interdisciplinary
cooperation.
• VR and conscious experience both present us with an
integrated ontology.
Ontology is not only a subfield in academic philosophy
investigating the logic and semantics of concepts like “being,”
“becoming,” or “existence.” The concept also refers to an area
in computer science and information science investigating
the representation, formal naming, and definition of
the categories, properties, and relations of the concepts,
data, and entities that substantiate a given—or even all
possible—domains. Interestingly, the conscious brain is an
information-processing system too, and it certainly represents
data and entities as “being,” “becoming,” or “existing.”
Conscious experience can be described as a highly-integrated
set of hypotheses about the likely causes of the inputs received
by the embodied brain, in the external as well as in the
internal (i.e., intraorganismic) environment. It is not a list
of propositions containing existential quantifiers. For an
information-processing system to be conscious means it
runs under an integrated ontology (see Box 1), a unified,
subsymbolic situation model, which is internally presented
to it in an integrated temporal frame of reference defining a
subjective now, a “window of presence” (Metzinger, 2003a).
VR creates ontologies and integrated situation models too,
but their presentation within a single “lived moment” (i.e., a
Jamesian “specious present,” the temporal frame of reference
referred to above, plus the construction of an experiential
subject; see Clowes and Chrisley, 2012, p. 511), is still left to
the brain of the user. If this is correct, then it follows that
if we understand the computational principles underlying
self-location and self-presentation within an internal temporal
frame of reference in our brains, and if future VR technology
were then to create a virtual “specious present” as part of a
yet-to-be-invented form of virtual time representation, then
this would amount to the creation of a very simple form of
artificial consciousness.
The conjunction of these two first points leads us to a bold
general claim: The “perfect” VR system would lead to artificial
consciousness—the creation of synthetic phenomenology (SP;
see Box 1)1. Call this the “SP-principle”: In its maximal
realization, VR would be tantamount to the creation of artificial
phenomenal states, to a technological realization of synthetic
phenomenology. Of course, this would have to include a fully
integrated multimodal scene, a virtual “specious present,” a self-
model that creates a first-person perspective by being a virtual
model of an epistemic agent (EAM; see Box 1 and section 2.5
in Metzinger, 2017, for details and further references), plus
global transparency (see Box 1). Today, there still is a biological
user, partially immersed in a visual situation model created by
advanced computer graphics, and what VR technology ultimately
aims at is real-time control of the information flow within the
minimally sufficient global neural correlate of consciousness
(GNCC; see Box 1).
This seems to be a second general principle: As of today,
the ultimate “engineering target” is the conscious model of
reality in a biological agent’s brain. VR is a non-invasive form
of neurotechnology targeting the GNCC. But imagine a world
without conscious biological creatures, in which an autonomous,
intelligent robot had learned to control its interaction with its
physical environment by opening an internal global workspace.
Then imagine that the content of this workspace is determined
by the “perfect” VR sketched above. If we imagine this robot as
internally using a maximal realization of VR—global integration,
specious present, transparency, and a self-model which it now
“confuses” with itself (see section Example 2: Embodiment
and Bodily Self-Consciousness and Metzinger, 2003a), then this
1In other writings, I have argued for a moratorium for synthetic phenomenology
on ethical grounds. For reasons of space, I exclude this issue here, but seeMetzinger
(2010), Metzinger (2013a), Mannino et al. (2015), and Metzinger (2018b).
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would be tantamount to a machinemodel of embodied conscious
experience.
• Phenomenal content and virtual content are both locally
determined.
It is widely accepted in philosophy of mind that phenomenal
properties supervene locally; and as of today, virtual content is
processed in single machines and presented by local devices to
individual users. This will soon change through the confluence
of developments in VR, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), and
social networks. For philosophers, this will create an interesting
new target for the internalism/externalism debate on mental
content (Menary, 2010). For computer scientists, the question
arises of what the “perfect” form of social VR would actually
be. In social VR, what exactly is the relationship between the
phenomenal content locally instantiated in the brains of multiple
users and shared virtual content created by causal interactions
distributed over different machines and artificial media? Social
VR is a field that needs a combination of new technological
approaches and rigorous conceptual analysis, for instance with
regard to the concept of “tele-immersion” (for an excellent
example, see Ohl, 2017).
The first contribution computer scientists can and certainly
will make lies in the field of interface design: For the special
domain of social VR, what would be the most efficient and
reliable interfaces linking human brains via BCI-coupling and
shared VR? This issue is theoretically relevant because it
addresses a classical philosophical problem: the “other-minds
problem” (Box 1). We assume that each of us has a direct
knowledge of our own experience, but we can never directly
know that someone other than ourselves is in the mental state
they are in. Could social VR create more direct forms of knowing
another person’s mind? Could it provide us with new means
of acquiring phenomenological concepts like “red” or “joy”
which we apply to inner states of sentient creatures other than
ourselves? We have already begun to causally couple the self-
models in human user’s brains to robots and avatars via robotic
and virtual re-embodiment today (see Figure 1), but what would
a more direct linkage of conscious minds involve? They could
constitute new inner “modes of presentation” for social facts,
as philosophers might say. It is interesting to note how we are
already beginning to re-embody ourselves not only in robots
and avatars, but also in other human being’s physical bodies
(De Oliveira et al., 2016). This naturally leads to the question
of virtually re-instantiating the higher levels of a human user’s
self-model in those of another human being’s self-model, of a
more abstract form of re-embodiment in another self-conscious
mind. This then would be the step from virtual body swap
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008) to virtual mind swap. Apart from
a careful conceptual description of research targets, the coupling
of whole conscious world-models plus embedded high-level,
cognitive self-representations (and not only bodily self-models)
would require a deep confluence of neurotechnology and VR.
The maximal realization of social VR would therefore consist
in creating an artificial platform on which whole individual
biological minds can merge, thereby transcending the principle
of local determination.
• Phenomenal content and virtual content can vary along
a continuum of opacity and transparency, respectively, of
explicit virtuality and projected realism.
Today, a broad standard definition of “phenomenal
transparency” (Box 1), on which most philosophers roughly
agree, is that it essentially consists in only the content
properties of a conscious mental representation being
available for introspection. Any non-intentional or “vehicle-
properties” involved in the representation are not available
for introspection. In other words, it is not experienced as
a representation. Introspectively, we can access its content,
but not the content-formation process itself. Typically, it is
assumed that transparency in this sense is a property of all
phenomenal states (for more, see Metzinger, 2003a,b).
But of course, the standard assumption is incomplete, because
opaque phenomenal representations also exist (whereas
unconscious states are neither transparent nor opaque in this
sense). Phenomenological examples of opaque state-classes are,
most notably, consciously experienced thoughts: We experience
them as mind-dependent, as mental representations that could
be true or false. Similarly, some emotions, pseudo-hallucinations,
and lucid dreams are subjectively experienced as representational
processes. Most importantly, the phenomenology of VR is
also typically characterized by incomplete immersion, with
varying degrees of opacity. This may change as the technology
advances. Phenomenally opaque processes sometimes appear
to us as deliberately initiated cognitive or representational
processes. However, sometimes they appear to be automatic
or spontaneously occurring; they are limited or even global
phenomenal simulations and frequently are not under the
experiential subject’s control.
Here is another concrete proposal: Perhaps the most
interesting contribution VR researchers could make is to
develop a reliable “volume control for realness.” Obviously,
a clear conceptual taxonomy is needed as well, but the
role of computer scientists in this type of cooperation
would lie in developing a metric for immersion and self-
identification—a quantifiable approach. The interesting point
here is that human phenomenology varies along a spectrum from
“realness” to “mind-dependence.” This frequently overlooked
phenomenological feature provides another conceptual bridge
into the representational deep structure of VR-environments:
there are degrees of immersion. VR environments can be more
or less realistic, and this general property is itself directly
and concretely reflected in the user’s phenomenology (cf. the
epigraph for this article). Below I will argue that VR is the most
relevant technology to create innovative experimental designs
for philosophical phenomenologists interested in empirically
researching the transparency/opacity continuum characterizing
human consciousness (as introduced in Metzinger, 2003b).
The “perfect” form of VR technology would be one in
which the user—or the experimental psychologist, neuroscientist,
or philosopher interested in consciousness—could reliably set
the “level of realness” for the experience. If we calibrate
the transparency parameter of ordinary waking states as
1, then possible levels would include values >1, leading
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to “hyperreal” phenomenologies (as in certain drug-induced
states of consciousness, during “ecstatic” epileptic seizures, or
religious experiences), and values <1 (as in “unreal” experiences
like depersonalization or derealization disorder). Some VR
applications aim at phenomenal presence, realism, embodiment,
and an illusion of immediacy, others will want to create a
“dreamlike” quality (for example in entertainment settings).
There are two specific subtypes of phenomenal states which (a)
are of special systematic interest to philosophers, and (b) are
directly related to the typical phenomenological profile created
by VR technology: the lucid dream state and the out-of-body
experience (OBE; see Metzinger, 2009b, 2013c, for philosophical
discussion).
There has been a lot of excellent work trying to create
OBEs in VR labs, trying to make it a repeatable, experimentally
controllable phenomenon (see Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager
et al., 2007 for classical studies; Blanke, 2012, for a review). So
far, these attempts have not been successful because users do not
yet look out of the eyes of the avatar offered as an alternative
unit of identification (UI, which in this and other articles is not
an abbreviation for “user interface,” but instead refers to the
conscious experience of self-identification; see Box 1, Metzinger,
2018a and the next section for a definition of the concept). Rather,
the resulting phenomenology typically resembles the clinical
phenomenon of heautoscopy. According to the self-model theory
of subjectivity (SMT; Metzinger, 2003a, 2008), the main reason
for this failure is that the user’s “interoceptive self-model” is
firmly locked in the biological body; it cannot be simulated in
an avatar yet. The interoceptive self-model is that layer of bodily
self-representation in the brain that is driven by internal signals
from the viscera and other areas signaling the state of the body
to the brain (Craig, 2009; Barrett and Simmons, 2015). The
prediction under SMT is that full identification with an avatar
can only be achieved under two conditions: Either the avatar has
its own interoceptive self-model that can be synchronized with
the biological counterpart in the user’s brain, or interoceptive
experience is selectively blocked and another artificial unit of
identification (Box 1) is created and technologically exploited.
According to SMT, a prime candidate would be the sense of effort
going along with mental forms of agency like controlling one’s
own attention, because this is what creates the sense of self on the
mental level. The empirical prediction from SMT is that if avatars
in virtual reality had a functional analog of visual attention
which the user could control, then the consciously felt “sense of
effort” of the user trying to control the avatar’s attention would
create a deep form of identification. This is another concrete
research proposal, derived from a philosophical theory, but fully
testable and open for interdisciplinary cooperation.We could call
the proposed strategy “subjective identification via interoceptive
extinction plus synchronized attentional agency.”
What about creating not OBEs (which involves an
externalized visuospatial perspective), but lucid dreams
with the help of VR technology? The dream body can also be
completely devoid of an interoceptive self-model. In section
Example 1: Consciousness, I said that waking consciousness
could be called a form of “online dreaming.” Could VR help
to create a new, distinct class of phenomenal states in the
form of a new version of lucid online dreaming? Having a
metric and an implemented, quantifiable “realness control”
for VR would enable experimental psychologists to create a
machine-model of the lucid dream state. It would be highly
interesting for philosophers of mind, dream researchers, and
phenomenologists if they could use VR technology to explore
the transparency/opacity gradient of their very own conscious
experience at will.
In both subtypes, certain content elements may be
experienced as only virtual (e.g., dream reality as such or
the immediate environment in which an OBE unfolds),
while, phenomenologically, others remain as ultimately real
(for example, even in lucid dreams other dream characters
encountered by the experiential subject are often taken to
be real entities, as is the transparent model of the knowing,
observing self in an OBE). On the technological side, the
reality/virtuality continuum encompasses all possible variations
and combinations of real and virtual objects (Milgram et al.,
1994; Milgram and Colquhoun, 1999). The “reality/virtuality
continuum” has been described as a concept in new media and
computer science, but it is interesting to note how our very own
everyday phenomenology also possesses elements that appear
“unreal” to us (optical illusions, benign pseudo-hallucinations)
or as only diffusely or not at all located in physical space, e.g., as
“unworldly,” “disembodied,” or “mental” (namely, mental action
and mind-wandering; see Metzinger, 2015, 2017).
However, as philosophers we must never forget that the
reality/virtuality continuum itself only appears in a virtual
model activated by our brain. In addition, this brain is
embodied and developed against the historical-cultural context
of the cognitive niche in which we are born. This is,
unfortunately, a deep structural feature which systematically
hides its own virtuality from its user, the biological organism
in which it appears. One philosophically interesting point is
that investigating the phenomenology of VR will give us a
deeper understanding of what it really means—and why it was
functionally adequate—that the reality-appearance distinction
became attentionally as well as cognitively available by being
represented on the level of appearance (Metzinger, 2003a). It also
leads to subtle and potentially novel insights into the specific
phenomenal character related to metaphysical indeterminacy
(see section VR-Phenomenology in the Context of Comparative
and Transcultural Philosophy).
Example 2: Embodiment and Bodily
Self-Consciousness
Advanced VR technology seeks not only to create the classical
place illusion described by Slater and Sanchez-Vives (2016)
(section Introduction), it also increasingly targets the deepest
layers of human self-consciousness by utilizing techniques for
virtual embodiment and robotic re-embodiment (Cohen et al.,
2012, 2014a,b; see vereproject.eu for further examples). We are
already beginning to use VR technology for re-embodiment in
other human bodies (De Oliveira et al., 2016) and many of
the more recent empirical results are highly interesting from a
conceptual and metatheoretical perspective (see Ehrsson, 2007;
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Lenggenhager et al., 2007, for classical studies; Metzinger, 2008,
2009a,b, for accessible introductions; Blanke, 2012, for a review).
First, they allow us to distinguish different levels of embodiment
and to develop a more fine-grained analysis of bodily self-
awareness in humans; second, they open the door to a deeper
understanding of the mechanism of identification underlying the
way in which a conscious subject of experience locates itself in
time and space by identifying with a body. Let me briefly explain
this point, as it is of interest for philosophers.
Let us say that for every self-conscious system S there exists a
phenomenal unit of identification (UI, Box 1) such that
• S possesses a single, conscious model of reality;
• the UI is a part of this model;
• at any given point in time t, the UI can be characterized by a
specific and determinate representational content C;
• such that C constitutes the transparent part of the system’s
phenomenal self-model (PSM; Metzinger, 2003a) at t.
If we assume a “predictive processing” model of human brain
activity (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016; Metzinger
and Wiese, 2017), then, for all human beings, C is always
counterfactual content because it does not refer to the currently
present, actual state of the world. The UI is the best hypothesis
the system has about its own global state (Limanowski and
Blankenburg, 2013; Limanowski, 2014). For human beings, C is
dynamic and highly variable, and it need not coincide with the
physical body as represented (for an example, see de Ridder,
2007). There exists a minimal UI, which is likely constituted
by pure spatiotemporal self-location (Blanke and Metzinger,
2009; Windt, 2010, 2017; Metzinger, 2013b,c); and there is
also a maximal UI, likely constituted by the most general
phenomenal property available to S at any point t, namely, the
integrated nature of phenomenality per se (Metzinger, 2013b,c,
2016). C is phenomenally transparent: Internally, S experiences
the representational content constituting the UI neither as
counterfactual nor as veridical, but simply as real. Phenomenally
experienced realness is an expression of successful prediction
error minimization, high model evidence, and counterfactual
richness (e.g., invariance under counterfactual manipulation).
Therefore, the UI simply is the transparent partition of
the PSM2. I submit that perhaps the central philosophical
relevance of recent work on virtual embodiment and robotic
re-embodiment is that it holds the promise of introducing a
set of more fine-grained conceptual distinctions into the theory
of embodiment and self-consciousness. Could VR researchers
also create a “volume control for self-identification”? Work
in VR that helps us to experimentally manipulate the UI in
a non-invasive but causally fine-grained manner has already
successfully demonstrated its relevance for the neuroscience of
bodily self-consciousness, for example by creating innovative
experimental designs. Philosophers have already cooperated with
neuroscientists and shown how the UI can be influenced to “drift
toward” an avatar and how peripersonal space can be expanded
in a VR-setting (Blanke et al., 2015; Noel et al., 2015; Serino
2This passage draws on an article in theOxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought,
see Metzinger (2018a).
et al., 2015). However, there are two logical steps that have not
yet been taken. There are two types of experiment that would
be of great interest to philosophers of mind: Maximizing the UI,
and deleting the UI from human phenomenal space altogether.
The open question is if engineers and scientists in VR could
technologically implement this.
How would one create a VR experience in which the user
becomes one with everything? Clearly, this would have to be an
entirely passive experimental setup, because any bodily or mental
interaction of the user with the system would immediately create
a felt sense of agency and therefore keep its phenomenal model
of reality split into subject and object, divided into a knowing self
and an external environment. How could one create an entirely
passive VR experience in which everything the user experiences
gradually turns into one big knowing self, a single conscious unit
of identification that has been maximized by being expanded to
the boundaries of the phenomenal world?
Experiments of the second type would aim at creating
selfless states of consciousness. Instead of ego-expansion they
would aim at ego-elimination. Such experiments would be
interesting because they would create a contrast class or a set of
alternative experiences not characterized by a UI—states without
any consciously experienced ego. The phenomenon of “ego
dissolution” is well-known from pharmacological interventions
by classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists
of the kappa opioid receptor (Millière, 2017) and it can be
measured, for example by the Ego-Dissolution Inventory (EDI;
Nour et al., 2016). It occurs in psychiatric diseases, and it has
also been reported across the centuries by spiritual practitioners
from many different cultures. Comparing results from both
types of experiments might help to decide the question if the
existence of a UI necessarily leads to a consciously experienced
sense of self, or if some states created by maximizing the
UI are actually selfless states if assessed with the help of
existing inventories for measuring the degree of ego-dissolution.
Here, one central question—highly relevant for philosophers,
psychologists, and neuroscientists alike—is whether research
in VR could help to establish a double dissociation between
the phenomenology of identification and the phenomenology
of selfhood.
EPISTEMOLOGY
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and is concerned
with questions such as: What are the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the possession of knowledge? How many kinds of
knowledge are there, and what is their structure, what are their
sources and boundaries? What makes a belief a justified belief
(Box 1)? Accordingly, VR-epistemology might ask questions
like these: How does one obtain knowledge about virtual
objects, and how do we arrive at justified beliefs about facts
holding in a virtual world? Are there such things as virtual
facts? Are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge
interestingly different if we limit our domain to perceptual
content presented via VR? What are the sources of knowledge
about elements of a given virtual world? Is justification relative to
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this specific class of epistemic objects internal or external to one’s
own mind?
Example 3: Amnestic Re-embodiment and
Epistemic Innocence
VR settings immediately remind every philosopher of Descartes’
dream argument: Even in a best-case scenario of sensory
perception, we can never rule out that we are now dreaming,
because dreaming is subjectively indistinguishable from waking
experience (see Windt, 2015, section Example 1: Consciousness).
If classical Cartesian Dream Skepticism is on the right track, then
at any given moment our implicit belief that we are awake might
be mistaken. If this basic background assumption is correct,
our current belief that we are, at this moment, not in VR
might be mistaken as well, although “in order for the VR to be
indistinguishable from reality, the participant would have to not
remember that they had “gone into” a VR system” (Slater and
Sanchez-Vives, 2016, p. 37).
One interesting form of collaboration between philosophers
and VR researchers would be to systematically transpose classical
philosophical thought experiments into VR-settings. Here, the
question would be if VR researchers could create a full-blown
“Cartesian dream.” Could there be something like “amnestic
re-embodiment” (see Box 1) in VR? It seems there are many
conceivable scenarios of VR use in which this constraint (let
us call it the “SSV-constraint,” as it was introduced by Slater
and Sanchez-Vives) could be satisfied, for example in animals
equipped with head-mounted displays, in human children, in
drug users, in sleep labs, or in patients suffering from severe
amnesia, intoxication syndromes, or dementia. Moreover, in
future entertainment scenarios or in therapeutic applications
it may exactly become a goal to purposefully satisfy the SSV-
constraint, to make users forget the fact that they currently are
in VR.
Bortolotti (2015a,b) recently introduced the concept of
“epistemic innocence” (Box 1) to articulate the idea that
certain mental processes such as delusion and confabulation
(which may count as suboptimal from an epistemological
perspective) may have not just psychological, but also epistemic
benefits. Perhaps amnestic re-embodiment in VR (say, in a
pharmacologically supported therapeutic context) could lead not
only to psychological benefits that are not simply purchased with
the epistemic cost of episodic amnesia, but which also causally
enable forms of genuine knowledge acquisition, for example
new forms of self-knowledge. Perhaps new philosophical ideas
like “amnestic re-embodiment” or “epistemic innocence” can be
fruitfully applied in the domain of VR if actually implemented
and viewed as a tool for self-exploration, cognitive enhancement,
or future psychotherapy. And of course, on a speculative
metaphysical level, it is only a question of time until the SSV-
constraint will be discussed in relation to real-life experience,
to traditional religious theories of reincarnation, “pre-birth
amnesia,” etc. In any case, it seems safe to predict that many
classical issues of external-world skepticism may re-appear in a
new guise, playing a central role for the new discipline of VR
epistemology.
Example 4: Knowing Personal Identity
Here, I name one particular example of great relevance for the
philosophy of law and the applied ethics of VR: The problem of
reliably knowing about another human agent’s personal identity
in VR. If I want to reliably interact with another human being
in VR, for example via avatar-to-avatar interaction, then I need
to know the identity of the person currently controlling or even
phenomenologically identifying with that avatar. This leads to
the problem of avatar ownership and individuation, which will
certainly be an important future issue for regulatory agencies to
consider.
How does one assign an unequivocal identity to the virtual
representation of a body or a person? Could there be something
like a chassis plate number, a license plate, or a “virtual vehicle
identification number” (VVIN)? We already have digital object
identifiers (DOIs) for electronic documents and other forms of
content, a form of persistent identification, with the goal of
permanently and unambiguously identifying the object with which
a given DOI is associated. But what about an avatar that is
currently used by a human operator, namely by functionally and
phenomenologically identifying with it? Should we dynamically
associate a “digital subject identifier” (DSI) with it? (Madary and
Metzinger, 2016, p. 17).
Maybe there can be a technological solution to this problem,
perhaps similar to the RSA cryptosystem. This presents a
technical question to mathematicians and computer scientists:
What would be a “non-hackable” mechanism for reliably
identifying the current user(s) of a given avatar? But even if we
find such a mechanism, the epistemological problem of other
minds remains. Even if I can be convinced of the identity
of an agent I encounter in VR in a way that suffices for all
practical and legal purposes, I will still be interested in a higher
degree of certainty when it comes to more direct interpersonal
relationships in social VR. Interestingly, as regards the personal
identity of social others nothing short of absolute certainty seems
to be what we are really interested in—although, as one might
certainly argue, even in “normal” non-VR scenarios there always
remains room for other-person skepticism, because the mere
logical possibility of misrepresenting personal identity can never
be fully excluded.
There is one variant of the personal-identity problem which
could soon become relevant and for which cooperation between
VR specialists and philosophical ethicists will be important. Let
us conceptually distinguish between an “avatar” as a digital
representation of a single human person in VR (over which
they can have agentive control and ownership, functionally
as well as on the level of conscious experience), a “human
agent” as a normal, self-conscious human being currently
controlling a biological body outside of VR, and a “virtual
agent” as a virtual character or person-model that is computer-
controlled, for example by an advanced AI. For human users
in VR, it may be impossible to distinguish between avatars and
virtual agents, that is, between digital representations of single
human persons currently controlled by a real, biological human,
and such representations which are actually AI-controlled, for
example by an artificial system not possessing self-consciousness
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and which does not satisfy the current human criteria for
personhood (Dennett, 1988). This may at first seem as just
an extension of the problem in current online computer
games where there is a mixture of non-playable characters and
other people, but there will be much more at stake in future
contexts generated by the technological confluence of VR and
autonomous AI-systems. Again, a technological solution to this
problem would be important to prevent social hallucinations,
consumer manipulation, or successful deception by malevolent
AI systems. But there are looming conceptual complexities.
For example, avatars could also be jointly controlled by
distributed groups of human beings (creating problems of legal
personhood, accountability, and ethical responsibility). There
could be digital person-models that are avatars and virtual
agents at the same time, because they are simultaneously human-
controlled and computer-controlled (HAVAS, see Box 1; for
example, resembling a self-consciously controlled biological body
possessing a large number of highly intelligent, but unconscious
motor subroutines), and perhaps in the future human agents
outside of VR could be partly computer-controlled as well. I will
not discuss any of these complexities here, but simply point out
that the problem of personal identity in VR poses challenges
for ethics and legal philosophy and that, on a psychological and
cultural level, it may greatly change the landscape of future social
interactions.
Although the exact etymological origin of the Latin concept
of persona is still controversial, it originally referred to the
masks worn by actors on stage. It is interesting to note how
avatars are exactly this: ever more complex virtual masks worn
by human actors on a virtual stage. Social VR resembles an
on-stage experience, involving encounters with unknown actors.
In this wider context, it may be helpful to recall how in 1938,
Antonin Artaud, in first introducing the concept of “virtual
reality” described the illusory nature of characters and objects
in the theater as “la réalité virtuelle” (in a collection of essays
entitled Le Théâter et son double) while at the same time another
classical metaphor for human consciousness is the “theatermodel
of mind” (Baars, 1997a,b; for a critique of this model, see Dennett,
1991; Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992). Isolating the necessary
and sufficient conditions for determining the identity of the
person behind any such virtual persona is one of the most
interesting epistemological problems for philosophers, but they
will need help from the VR community in determining what
is technologically possible, what is not, and what are rational,
evidence-based strategies for risk minimization [the issue will
certainly generalize to human interaction with intelligent agents
categorized as non-persons, e.g., as a result of future AI/VR
confluence, see section Example 7: The “Postbiotic Social Boot-
Strapping Scenario” (PSBS)].
METAPHYSICS
VR can be interestingly described as a computationally
implemented ontology (Heim, 1994, 2000; Chalmers, 2017). Its
virtual character consists in the quality of its entities having
their attributes without sharing a (real or imagined) physical
form, but solely by creating a functional emulation of real
objects. On a more abstract level of analysis, virtual realities are
functional structures defined by input/output relations and by
internal relations between states with different and often complex
causal roles. Via interfaces enabling sensorimotor interaction,
they have the potential to causally enable the instantiation of
specific phenomenal properties in the brains of human users.
When implemented and in direct causal interaction with an
embodied human user, they can perhaps also be interestingly
described as explicit assumptions about what exists, as a new
type of “metaphysical affordance”: I can take this for real. VR
opens a space of possible existence assumptions. In providing an
explicit model of reality to the user it can also represent objects,
properties, and spatial and temporal relations, offer concrete
affordances for action, or even present other agentive selves to
this user, making them available for reliable and systematic social
interaction.
But the novel space of causal interaction opened by VR is not
limited to providing affordances for sensorimotor engagement.
With the help of advanced brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) we
can imagine “mental” actions bypassing the non-neural body (see
section Example 5: Walking Around in Your Own NCC With
the Help of rt-fMRI-NCCF). Similarly, we can imagine much
more causally direct forms of intersubjective communication
usingmuchmore disembodied forms of social cognition, perhaps
even making the “mental” states of users an explicit element of
VR (see section Social and Political Philosophy: The danger of
complex social hallucinations). As such they could be mutually
manipulated, with the interaction acquiring a causal force on its
own. Additionally, in VR, assumptions about what exists need
not obey the physical laws governing our world: In principle,
the set of worlds defined by a given level of VR technology will
often be much larger than what would be nomologically possible
in the actual world. On the other hand, obvious constraints of
technological feasibility again strongly compress the space of
mere logical possibility.
VR clearly opens new spaces of causal interaction for human
agents, but its relevance to philosophical metaphysics is not
immediately obvious. Imagine an empty room with a connected
headset lying on a table while a computer is running a complex
virtual reality demonstration. It would be hard to construct any
metaphysical mysteries in this situation. For example, speaking
of “virtual objects” or even “virtual worlds” being created by the
machine would not justify assuming that just the running of the
system itself changes physical reality in any interesting sense. No
new building blocks of reality are created.
VR only becomes philosophically interesting when causally
coupled to the pre-existing conscious model of reality running
in a user’s biological brain (Clowes and Chrisley, 2012, p. 511).
Then it begins to change the phenomenal ontology underlying
the user’s subjective experience, and of course many unconscious
expectations as well. In particular, certain high-level priors and
assumptions about what the true causal sources of current
sensory input really are may now begin to change as the
model containing them is continuously updated [see section
Example 1: Consciousness (point 1)]. What would we say if
an entirely unconscious, but highly complex and intelligent
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robot began to interact with a VR system? Would we assign
any special metaphysical status to the unconscious internal
ontology that emerges as the robot learns to successfully interact
with the VR? Obviously, we would not want to say that any
relevant new metaphysical entities have been created. What has
changed is a model, not the deep structure of the physical
world. Call this the “Principle of Metaphysical Irrelevance”: VR
technology per se does not create any new “virtual objects”
in a metaphysically interesting sense. But what about virtual
subjects? I think the “Principle of Metaphysical Irrelevance” may
be interestingly different or invalid in the case of social ontologies:
What if independent groups of intelligent, virtual agents began
to internally model their social relationships in the way human
beings do, creating a robust form of virtual intersubjectivity (see
Example #7 below)?
The general principle is that to have an ontology is to
interpret a world: The human brain, viewed as a representational
system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology
too (Metzinger and Gallese, 2003). It creates primitives and
makes existence assumptions, decomposing target space in
a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is
functionally significant. It continuously updates its model of
reality, minimizing prediction error (Friston, 2010; Wiese and
Metzinger, 2017). There are explicit and implicit assumptions
about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the
causal profile of the brain’s motor output and its representational
deep structure. But very often in VR, a completely different
world needs to be interpreted and predicted by the brain.
Thus, an alternative causal structure has to be extracted. For
example, the human motor system normally constructs goals,
actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world
it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role
to them, and empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain
models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal
representations of organism-object-relations. Obviously, such
relations can undergo dramatic changes in VR as the brain
continually adapts a hierarchically structured model of reality
to the external invariances provided by artificially created
input. But the ontology of the human brain, even when
causally embedded in an alien media environment, always
remains a representation of the likely causal structure of the
world. It is just the current best guess about this causal
structure.
In sum, I think that analytical metaphysics is likely
the area in philosophy where we can expect the least
fruitful interaction with the VR community, simply because
virtual ontologies are orthogonal to philosophical problems
in metaphysics. Nevertheless, for philosophers interested in
metaphysics, there may still be many interesting issues.
These issues include the relationship between possible-world
theory and VR; the status of properties, categories, universals,
individuals, abstract and fictitious objects, events and selves
when epistemically accessed under a VR-mode of presentation;
questions about virtual time and virtual space [section Example
1: Consciousness (point 2)]; and perhaps also the promise
of a richer and more precise account of what actually
constitutes a Lebenswelt [Box 1; I return to this issue in
section Example 7: The “Postbiotic Social Boot-Strapping
Scenario” (PSBS)]. Maybe progress on this traditional concept
can be achieved as we now begin to construct entirely
new life-worlds from scratch. I will also give one example
of unexpected metaphysical contact points between VR and
intercultural philosophy in the final section on “Comparative
Philosophy.”
NEW SUBFIELDS: DIGITAL AESTHETICS,
RECENT PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY,
AND MEDIA THEORY
There are many newer areas of philosophical research for
which VR is an obviously central target, including aesthetic
judgement and experience (Shelley, 2015), the philosophy of
digital art (Thomson-Jones, 2015), the philosophy of technology
(Franssen et al., 2015, section 4.1 in Gualeni, 2015), and media
philosophy (Gualeni, 2015, Ch. 7; Heim, 2000; Sandbothe,
2000; de Mul, 2015). There already exists a growing literature
on VR in these fields, and the interested reader may find
entry points to the relevant debates in the works cited
here.
ACTION THEORY, FREE WILL, AND
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: NOVEL
AFFORDANCES FOR ACTION
Increasingly, avatars are not just dynamic, user-controlled
models of bodies in space. They also begin to enable
sensory perception and instantiate complex properties like
emotional expression, intelligent gaze-following, and natural
language production. Avatars are gradually turning into semi-
autonomous, user-controlled models of virtual selves. Above, we
conceptually distinguished between avatars and virtual agents,
but it is certainly conceivable that digital representations of
persons emerge that fall under both concepts simultaneously.
One philosophically as well as technically interesting aspect
lies in the prediction that virtual agents will, by being
coupled to artificial intelligence (AI), gain strong cognitive
self-models. For example, they could function as complex
output devices or personoid interfaces by which larger AI
systems communicate with humans. But to be really good
interfaces, they will have to model the needs and goals of
their human users and engage in advanced social cognition.
If they reflexively apply their social cognition modules to
themselves, they may therefore begin to represent themselves
as “knowing selves,” even if they are still partly human-
controlled. Therefore, it is also conceivable that such hybrid
avatar/virtual agent-systems (Box 1) become proper epistemic
agents (EAMs; cf. Metzinger, 2017, 2018a; Box 1) rather
than merely virtual bodies moving in virtual space, thereby
simulating a system that possesses and actively expands its own
knowledge.
A second important aspect of this historical development
is that there already exists a biologically grounded self-
model in the human operator’s nervous system. The human
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nervous system generates another virtual self-model which
often includes an EAM. It has been optimized over millions
of years of biological evolution and possesses unconscious as
well as conscious content layers. Today, avatars are mostly
causally coupled to the phenomenal self-model (PSM;Metzinger,
2003a, 2008) in human brains, but this may change in
the future. First pilot studies (Cohen et al., 2012, 2014a,b)
demonstrate that, via virtual or robotic re-embodiment, elements
of VR can turn into dynamic components of extended self-
representation, which not only co-determine locally instantiated
phenomenal properties in the human brain, but also enable
historically new forms of action. Let us therefore look at
novel, philosophically relevant affordances for action potentially
provided by VR.
Example 5: Walking Around in Your Own
NCC With the Help of rt-fMRI-NCCF
In consciousness research (Metzinger, 1995, 2000), a standard
background assumption is that in the domain of biological
creatures and for every form of conscious content there exists a
minimally sufficient neural correlate (NCC; see Chalmers, 2000,
for a definition, and Fink, 2016, for a refined account). At every
point in time, there will also be a minimally sufficient global
NCC (see Box 1): the set of neurodynamical properties which
fully determines the content of subjective experience at this very
instant and which has no proper subset of properties that would
have the same effect. Let me draw attention to, and at the same
time propose, a highly specific application of VR technology
here. One technological possibility that will be of great interest
for philosophers would be a highly selective combination of VR
and neurofeedback generated by real-time functional magnetic
resonance imagining, but explicitly targeting the global NCC
only.
Let us call this “rt-fMRI-NCCF” (see Box 1). This would
be a variant of real-time fMRI-based neurofeedback, but
employing VR technology and specifically targeting the neural
basis of consciousness. Thus, a real-time fMRI representation
of the global NCC would be directly converted into a virtual
reality environment: a perceivable dynamic landscape which the
conscious subject could passively observe, in which it could
navigate, and with which it could then causally interact in entirely
new ways. Of course, the VR-based form of rt-fMRI-NCCF I
am proposing here would never be “real-time” in any more
rigorous conceptual sense, but it would generate historically
new forms of self-awareness and afford completely new types
of phenomenological self-exploration, including a model-based
control of one’s own conscious experience (Flohr, 1989;
Jacquette, 2014). At present, the only neurophenomenological
configuration that comes close to rt-fMRI-NCCF is the stable
lucid dream of a scientifically informed person. The stable lucid
dream is a conscious state in which the experiential subject
knows that everything it feels and sees is determined by the NCC
currently active in the sleeping physical body, but unlike the
potential rt-fMRI-NCCF, it lacks an external, technically realized
feedback loop (Metzinger, 2003a, 2013c; Windt and Metzinger,
2007; Voss et al., 2014).
Example 6: PSM-Actions
PSM-actions are all those actions in which a human being
exclusively uses the conscious self-model in her brain to initiate
an overt action. Of course, there will have to be feedback loops
for complex actions, for instance, adjusting a grasping movement
in real-time when seeing through the camera eyes of a robot
(something still far from possible today). But the relevant causal
starting point of the entire action is now not the flesh and bone
body, but only the conscious self-model in our brain. In PSM-
actions, we simulate an action in the self-model—in the inner
image of our body—and a machine performs it.
Such experiments are interesting for philosophers, because
they touch conceptual issues like action theory, agentive self-
consciousness, free will, ethical responsibility, and culpability in a
FIGURE 1 | “PSM-actions”: A test subject lies in a nuclear magnetic
resonance tomograph at the Weizmann Institute in Israel. With the aid of data
goggles, he sees an avatar, also lying in a scanner. The goal is to create the
illusion that he is embodied in this avatar. The test subject’s motor imagery is
classified and translated into movement commands, setting the avatar in
motion. After a training phase, test subjects were able to control a far remote
robot in France “directly with their minds” via the Internet, seeing the
environment in France through the robot’s camera eyes. Figure with friendly
permission from Doron Friedmann and Michel Facerias; written informed
consent for publication of figure has been provided by Michael Facerias.
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legal sense3. On one hand, it is obvious that the phenomenal self-
model (PSM) often is a crucial part of a control hierarchy: it is
an abstract computational tool for sensorimotor self-control. The
PSM is a means to predict and monitor certain critical aspects
of the process in which the organism generates flexible, adaptive
patterns of behavior and also enables a degree of veto control.
On the other hand, it is highly plastic: several representations of
objects external to the body can transiently be integrated into
the self-model. In tool use, a hammer or pliers could be such
an object, but rubber hands can demonstrate that the whole
process can also take place in a passive condition, by bottom-
up multisensory integration alone. For tool-use, “control by
embedding” may be a general principle—tools are extensions of
bodily organs that need to be controlled to generate intelligent
and goal-directed behavior. Whenever the physical body is
extended by sticks, stones, rakes, or robot arms, the virtual
self-model must be extended as well. Only if an integrated
representation of the body-plus-tool exists can the extended
system of body-plus-tool in its entirety become part of the
brain’s predictive control hierarchy. How else could one learn
to intelligently—i.e., flexibly and in a context-sensitive manner—
use a tool, without integrating it into the conscious self?
As I have explained elsewhere (Metzinger, 2003a, 2009a),
human beings possess physical and virtual organs at the same
time. The conscious self-model is a paradigm example of a virtual
organ, allowing us to own feedback loops, to initiate control
processes, and to maintain and flexibly adapt them. What is
new is that whole-body surrogates now increasingly provide the
human brain with new affordances for action, either as virtual
avatars or as physical robots coupled to the virtual self-model
in the biological brain. Some element of the expanded control
circuit are physical (like the brain and tools), others are virtual
(like the self-model and the goal-state simulation). Robots are
physical tools; avatars are virtual bodies. It is therefore possible
to transiently embed them into the PSM and thereby causally
control them “directly out of one’s own mind.”
If this general perspective is correct, then we have a
maximally parsimonious strategy to scientifically explain self-
consciousness without assuming an ontological entity called
“the self.” Prediction, testing, and explanation can take
place in a much more parsimonious conceptual framework,
3Consider the following thought experiment adapted from Metzinger (2013a).
Imagine you are lying in a scanner, controlling a robot at a distance, seeing
through its eyes and even feeling motor feedback when its arms and legs move.
Experientially, you completely identify with the robot, while at the same time you
are moving freely in a situation in which also other human beings are present.
Suddenly the new husband of your ex-wife enters the room. He is the person who,
a few months ago, destroyed all your plans and your entire personal life. You
again feel the mortification, deep hurt, sense of inner emptiness, and existential
loneliness following the divorce. Spontaneously an aggressive impulse arises inside
you, and almost simultaneously a brief, violent fantasy of killing him emerges. You
try to calm yourself down, but before you can suppress the motor imagery that
involuntarily went along with the violent fantasy in your conscious mind, the robot
has already killed the man with one single, forceful blow. You regain control and
are able to back away a few steps. Subjectively it feels as if you never had a chance
to control your behavior. But how can one decide if you—from a purely objective
perspective—perhaps still possessed the capability of suppressing the aggressive
impulse, just in time? In an ethical sense, are you responsible for the consequences
of the robot’s actions?
namely, by introducing the concept of a “transparent self-
model” (a conscious model of the person as a whole,
which cannot be experienced as a model). VR technology
is relevant because it offers instruments for experimental
testing by selectively influencing different representational layers
of the human self-model: bodily self-location, perspective-
taking, motion experience, affective self-representation, and so
on. One role of VR researchers could be to develop new
instruments by which causal dependencies and hypothetical
double dissociations between such representational layers can be
tested, demonstrated, and technologically exploited, for example
by new clinical applications. The maximal realization or “perfect
avatar” would be one in which the user can precisely select what
aspects of his or her conscious self-model she wants to change by
identifying with a digitally created self-representation.
Directly coupling a human PSMwith an artificial environment
is an example for a new type of consciousness technology, one
that might even be called a “technology of the self ” (section
4.3 in Gualeni, 2015). Currently the effects are still weak, and
there are many technical problems. However, it is possible that
technological progress will happen faster than expected. What
would we do if systems for virtual or robotic re-embodiment
became able to function fluidly, with many degrees of freedom,
and in real-time? What new conscious states would become
possible if one were also able to control feedback with the help
of a computer-aided brain stimulation directly aimed at the
user’s self-model, again bypassing the non-neural body? What
historically new forms of intersubjectivity and social cooperation
could emerge if it were suddenly possible to simultaneously
connect several human persons and their self-models via coupled
brain computer interfaces, and perhaps even tomerge them?
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
THE DANGER OF COMPLEX SOCIAL
HALLUCINATIONS
The number of contact points between VR technology and
political philosophy is too large to even begin creating a short list.
The convergence of VR and existing social networks may lead
to new forms of machine-based manipulation in the formation
of political will, novel threats to privacy and autonomy, and
a belittlement of the actual political process outside of VR
(section 3.2 in Gualeni, 2015). Perhaps most importantly, it
is conceivable that what today we call “real life outside of
VR” or “the real cultural/historical/political process unfolding
in the actual world” would become increasingly experienced
as just one possible reality among many others. This might
incrementally lead to a dangerous trivialization of real-world
suffering and an unnoticed, implicit relativism with respect to
value judgements in the original sphere of social interaction (in
which any VR technology is still grounded). I would like to
term this risk “VR-induced political apathy,” brought about by
creeping psychological changes caused in users by a toxic form
of mental immersion into a novel medium that originally held
the promise to facilitate and enhance the democratic process. As
Stefano Gualeni puts the point:
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The interactive experiences of virtual worlds, together with their
characteristic combinatorial and procedural processes, can in fact
be seen as both
• facilitating and encouraging individual engagement in the
socio-political sphere, and
• denying and confusing the ontological superiority of the world
indexed as actual over a myriad of virtual ones. This levelling
of value comes with a momentous belittlement of the historical
process and of existence itself.
Understood from the proposed perspective, all virtual worlds can be
deemed as holding an implicit political relevance that is a derivation
of their combinatorial, modular, and self-organizing constitution.
Both the use and the design of virtual worlds as means of production
are, thus, implicitly political activities (Gualeni, 2015, p. 129).
We may well live through a historical transition that we are
only beginning to understand. In the beginning, avatars were
just moving statues, models of bodies in time and space. As they
have become more realistic, new features like the functionality
of gaze-following or emotional expression via facial geometry
have been added. It is interesting to note how even at this early
stage of VR technology what I have termed “social hallucinations”
(see Box 1) are emerging: In users, the phenomenology of
“presence” can now be enhanced by a phenomenology of being
socially situated. Users are confronted not only with virtual
models of other bodies, but with actual selves—other agents
who are autonomous subjects of experience, mutually sharing
an intersubjective phenomenology of presence. The classical
“place illusion” (section 1.3 in Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2016)
is now complemented and strengthened by an “other-minds
illusion.”
My first point is that such social hallucinations will soon
become increasingly sophisticated and thus much stronger. One
research target is the interaction of the place illusion with the
other-minds illusion: how strong is the causal interdependence
between spatial immersion and social immersion? If we
imagine human users communicating with advanced AI systems
in natural language and via anthropomorphic (or at least
person-like) interfaces, then we will soon reach a stage
where unconscious machines are automatically modeled as
independent cognitive agents by the human brain. We may
have no control over this process. If so, virtual agents will
automatically be experienced as thinkers of thoughts, and the
human brain will inevitably begin to predict their behavior
as belonging to systems possessing high-level psychological
properties like episodic memory, attentional control, and self-
consciousness. The combination of VR and AI may therefore
lead to a situation in which VR-based anthropomorphic
interfaces begin to target the naturally evolved modules
for social cognition and agent detection in the biological
brains of their human users in intelligent and ever more
successful ways. Self-optimizing, but entirely unconscious
AI/VR-systems might discover that it simply is most efficient
to be perceived as self-aware cognitive agents by humans,
consequently creating robust and complex social hallucinations
as a new phenomenological foundation for man-machine
communication.
For empirical researchers in the field of social cognition, this
will be of great interest, because it allows for highly innovative
and precisely controllable forms of experimental design. The
maximal model would be one in which the user’s other-mind
illusion can be created by every virtual entity she encounters
during her VR experience. For philosophers, the impact will
extend beyond obviously relevant classical topics like the other-
minds problem, social ontology, or political philosophy. The
combination of social VR and AI will also touch many issues in
applied ethics, including: What is the proper ethical assessment
of deliberately causing social hallucinations in human users? Are
there ethically recommendable, non-paternalistic applications of
VR-based other-minds illusions (see section Applied Ethics)?
Example 7: The “Postbiotic Social
Boot-Strapping Scenario” (PSBS)
Let me end this section by briefly describing what I think is
the most interesting conceptual possibility from a philosophical
perspective. I call it the “postbiotic social boot-strapping
scenario” (PSBS; see Box 1), and it would again involve a
combination of VR and AI.
Let us assume that future AI systems have begun using
avatars—VR-based person-like interfaces—to communicate with
humans. Non-persons communicate with persons via person-
models. Through advanced user modeling those systems will
have learned how to cause the most reliable and robust social
hallucinations in their users, thereby optimizing their overall
functionality. Now the crucial assumption behind the PSBS
is the logical possibility that such combined AI/VR-systems
begin to mutually cause social hallucinations in each other.
This would occur by the systems applying the algorithms they
originally developed for man-machine interaction to machine-
machine communication, but still using individual virtual avatars
as their interfaces. What I call the “social boot-strapping
scenario” would begin when such systems attempt to cause social
hallucinations in other AIs as well as in humans. It is conceivable
that the continued optimization of combined AI/VR-systems
would generate second-order virtual agents (see Box 1), that
is, virtual entities that not only possess an internal model of
themselves in order to control their behavior, but also harbor a
functionally adequate misrepresentation of themselves as being
socially situated. A first-order virtual agent would be controlled
by an AI that uses it as a communication interface. A second-
order virtual agent would be driven by a different self-model:
it would falsely represent other AIs/virtual agents as real, self-
conscious entities. It would represent itself as standing in genuine
social relations—as a genuine subject embedded in a network of
intersubjective relationships. It is also plausible to assume that
such forms of functionally adequate misrepresentation might
make groups of virtual agents and groups of interacting AI
systems much more efficient—the added explicitly social layer
of self-optimization could enable a new level of complexity
that would serve to gradually improve the intelligence of the
newly emerged overall system. Such second-order agents would
therefore not only cause robust social hallucinations in their
human users, but also in the AIs controlling them. Groups
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of such intelligent virtual agents using personoid avatars as
their interface or “outward appearance” would instantiate a
new property—“virtual intersubjectivity”—by drawing on and
mimicking algorithms and neural mechanisms which first
appeared in the psychological evolution of biological organisms,
were later optimized in man-machine communication, and are
now virtually implementing certain types of social cognition
and functionally adequate forms of self-deception in postbiotic
systems.
Therefore, they would necessarily begin to represent each
other as sharing a common Lebenswelt. A virtual Lebenswelt—
or “life-world”—is a pre-given social world in which subjects
experience themselves as being united by a primordial quality
of “togetherness,” as inhabiting a universe which is no longer
“merely virtual,” but rather intersubjectively given. A Lebenswelt
is co-constituted by a shared first-person plural perspective, by
a mentally represented “we,” and is therefore absolutely real and
self-evident for every individual virtual agent. To put the point
differently, while human beings might still describe the internal
social context generated by the interaction of combined AI/VR-
systems as “virtual” or “simulated,” these systems themselves
might evolve a fully transparent representation of their own life-
world and accordingly arrive at very different epistemological
conclusions about the social context in which they evolve.
This is an example of a new field where philosophers working
on theories of social cognition and intersubjectivity could very
fruitfully interact with researchers in VR, creating simulated “toy
societies.” Here is the most provocative question: Is our own,
human Lebenswelt ultimately a biologically evolved variant of the
PSBS? Is it based on functionally adequate misrepresentations
enabling biological organisms to “hallucinate selfhood into
each other”? Can we model the relevant transition in virtual
agents? Should we attempt to do this, or would we be ethically
required to relinquish such research pathways altogether?
Clearly, such research may be ethically problematic, because it
may lead to artificial suffering or a dangerous and irreversible
intelligence explosion in autonomously self-optimizing social
systems.
APPLIED ETHICS
Less dramatically, VR technology has the potential to increasingly
change what many philosophers, including Edmund Husserl
and Jürgen Habermas, have traditionally called the “life-
world” of human beings. As explained above, a life-world is
partly constituted by a prescientific, collective phenomenology
of intersubjectivity. This underlying phenomenology in turn
gives rise to apparently self-evident cultural systems and
normative orders which attempt to give a meaning to life
and to the shared social institutions that stabilize patterns of
collective action. These patterns causally influence psychological
properties, determine the content of seemingly individual
cognitive processes, and may even shape our personality
structure. Elsewhere, I have argued that because of this, VR
technology will function as a new cognitive niche to which the
human mind will adapt:
What is historically new, and what creates not only novel
psychological risks but also entirely new ethical and legal
dimensions, is that one VR gets ever more deeply embedded
into another VR: the conscious mind of human beings, which
has evolved under very specific conditions and over millions of
years, now gets causally coupled and informationally woven into
technical systems for representing possible realities. Increasingly,
it is not only culturally and socially embedded but also shaped
by a technological niche that over time itself quickly acquires a
rapid, autonomous dynamics and ever new properties. This creates
a complex convolution, a nested form of information flow in which
the biological mind and its technological niche influence each other
in ways we are just beginning to understand. It is this complex
convolution that makes it so important to think about the Ethics
of VR in a critical, evidence-based, and rational manner (Madary
and Metzinger, 2016, p. 20).
VR technology poses many new problems for applied ethics,
ranging from unexpected psychological risks to military
applications. Rather than exploring the ethical and sociocultural
ramifications of VR here, I instead refer readers to the first Code
of Ethical Conduct Michael Madary and I developed (Madary
and Metzinger, 2016). Applied ethics is a prime example of
another domain of philosophical research that is of highest
relevance for researchers in the field of VR, consumers, and
policy-makers alike.
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
VR, if applied as a conceptual metaphor in different domains
of inquiry, possesses great heuristic fecundity. We have already
seen that there are considerable commonalities linking VR and
the phenomenon of conscious experience (section Example 1:
Consciousness). Religious faith is another example of a domain
in which unexpected analogies can be discovered. Religious faith
dramatically changes the model of reality under which a human
being operates, because it installs or superimposes a new virtual
ontology. We can view the evolution of religion as an evolution
of pre-technological augmented reality (AR) systems aimed at
expanding the phenomenology and motivational structure of
human beings. Can VR and AR be used as fruitful conceptual
metaphors for the philosophy of religion? Let us take a look.
Example 8: Having Faith as Biosocially
Evolved Augmented Reality
In standard situations, the perceptual phenomenology of
human beings is largely determined by top-down predictions
colliding with the sensory input generated by continuous
embodied interaction with an external environment (Friston,
2010). Augmented reality adds an environmental layer that
is invisible for others, superimposing a new and additional
set of priors onto the conscious subject’s model of reality.
A novel perspective on organized religion emerges from
this: religious-belief-as-enculturated-augmented-reality, where
religion is a set of representational functions, originally realized
by cultural practices like burial rites, ancestor cults, prayers,
sermons and increasingly complex rituals. Three obvious and
well-documented adaptive advantages provided by this set of
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functions are (a) offering a viable psychological strategy for
mortality-denial, (b) increasing social cohesion in the context of
in-group/out-group conflicts, and (c) the stabilization of existing
social hierarchies. As a crude analogy, religious faith is like a
metaphysical version of Pokémon Go: it populates the subject’s
life-world with invisible beings like Gods, angels, and spirits,
thereby causally enabling new forms of social hallucination and
self-deception (Trivers, 2000). Within a given evolutionary or
cultural context, such virtual expansions of a pre-given conscious
model of reality may prove to be functionally adequate. Having a
religious faith augments an agent’s subjective reality, and it often
motivates in-group prosocial behavior.
Another example of a related new concept is “transreality
gaming” (e.g., Lindley, 2004). Transreality gaming describes a
type or mode of gameplay that combines playing a game in a
virtual environment with game-related, physical experiences in
the real world and vice versa. In this approach, a player evolves
andmoves seamlessly through various physical and virtual stages,
brought together in one unified game space. Letme ask a question
that may, initially, sound overly provocative, but which may later
prove to possess great heuristic potential: Is religious practice a
form of transreality gaming? Are religious rituals like funerals,
ancestor cults, or prayer not attempts at an integration of virtual
worlds with a biologically grounded life-world? The notion of
“transreality gaming” also gives us a new way of looking at what
a conscious human being really is: a biological organism that
has evolved into a “transreality interaction platform” by enabling
causal interactions across physical and virtual reality (Martin
and Laviola, 2016). From this perspective, religious practices are
a particularly interesting special case of this general principle,
governing and stabilizing the “player’s” day-to-day interactions
with their social environment as well as with their own mind.
Above, I have experimentally framed the evolution of religion
as the evolution of augmented reality systems aimed at expanding
the phenomenology of human beings, hypothetically later
enabling successful, scalable cooperation in ever larger groups.
I have provisionally defined it as a set of representational
functions, originally realized by externalized cultural practices
like burial rites, ancestor cults, prayers, sermons and increasingly
complex rituals, later internalized into the minds of individual
agents. This new perspective, leads to a whole range of
interesting questions of whether the same set of functions could
also be technologically implemented. Could there be religious
practice in VR? Would it count as valid from a theological
perspective? What about the technological implementation of
an individual “VR heaven,” where users encounter a medial
environment allowing them to interact with their own ideal
self, with an impersonal ideal observer, or with virtual angels,
saints, and deities? Could there be “VR churches” giving
an individual user a comparable phenomenology and the
same psychological effects as real social interactions in an
embodied religious context? Can there be technologically
mediated “virtual rituals” serving basically the same—or
historically new—functions? If so, Slater’s and Sanchez-Vives’
programmatic idea of “Enhancing Our Lives with Immersive
Virtual Reality” could even be extended to the sphere of religious
practice.
Please note how the “convolution principle” introduced in
section Applied Ethics still holds. Again, what is new, and what
creates not only novel psychological risks, but also entirely
new soteriological dimensions, is that one virtual reality gets
ever more deeply embedded into another virtual reality: The
conscious mind of human beings, which has evolved under very
specific conditions over millions of years might become causally
coupled and informationally woven into technical systems for
representing possible realities—and these could even be of a
religious type. Now, the religious mind is not only culturally
and socially embedded, but also shaped by a technological niche,
a niche that over time quickly acquires rapid, autonomous
dynamics and ever new properties. This creates a complex
convolution, a nested form of information flow in which
the transcendence-seeking mind and its technological niche
influence each other in ways we are just beginning to understand.
Religious practice in VR could be one of these ways.
VR-PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT
OF COMPARATIVE AND TRANSCULTURAL
PHILOSOPHY
The VR-experience has a distinct and unique phenomenological
profile. What we currently lack is not only a philosophical
meta-theory for VR-phenomenology, but suitable conceptual
instruments that help us bring out the essence of what really
makes conscious experience in VR so interestingly different.
At the same time, an important and strongly growing area
of philosophy is comparative philosophy, which aims at
bringing together and perhaps even integrating philosophical
traditions that have developed in relative isolation from one
another and that are defined quite broadly along cultural and
regional lines (Wong, 2017). I will conclude this contribution
by very briefly pointing to a way in which a central
concept of Buddhist philosophy—namely, suññata¯—could be
conceptually connected to a philosophical metatheory of virtual
reality.
Example 9: The Phenomenology of
Emptiness and Virtuality
Depending on doctrinal context, the Buddhist notion of
“emptiness” or “voidness” has many different meanings.
Buddhist metaphysics is radically anti-substantialist and
anti-essentialist. In a nutshell, this means that entities are
conceptually analyzed as being devoid of inherent existence
and as lacking any form of “true inner nature”; what in
Western traditions has often been simply called “reality”
actually is characterized by metaphysical “hollowness” and
indeterminacy as to existence vs. non-existence. My first
point here is that exactly the same is true of so-called “virtual
objects” and other entities like properties, whole situations,
or simulated selves as represented in VR. They are not
ontologically self-subsistent (i.e., they cannot independently
“stand” or independently hold themselves in existence), and
they have no self-sustaining, enduring, or essential inner
nature beyond the present moment and the ongoing process
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of being virtually represented as such. They depend not only
on a complex network of functional relations implemented
in a given computational system, but also on this pre-
existing network being causally coupled to the physical
brain of a user already endowed with consciousness and self-
consciousness. Entities in VR are a paradigmatic example of
what Buddhist metaphysics would call “dependent origination”:
impermanent phenomena arising out of a fluid dynamic of
causal interrelatedness.
Interestingly, there is a semantic connection linking the
classical Pali term suññata¯ to the concept of “virtuality”
(stemming from the late-medieval scholarly neologism
virtualis, which in turn preserves elements like “potentiality”
and “latency of possibilities” characterizing the original
Aristotelian notion of “dynamis”). To see this partial,
but philosophically relevant overlap, it is particularly
helpful to focus not only on the metaphysical, but also
the phenomenological reading of suññata¯, an absolutely
central and classical term, which has been a cornerstone
of Buddhist philosophy over many centuries (Williams,
2008).
With a minimalist sketch of the metaphysical background
already in hand, let us therefore proceed to the phenomenological
level of analysis. The VR-experience has a unique
phenomenological profile which is another excellent example
of a potential future target for interdisciplinary research,
and comparative philosophy may actually help us to see
the relevant features more clearly. The phenomenological
reading of “emptiness” refers to a specific contemplative
mode: a way of consciously experiencing the world and the
process of knowing this world as inherently selfless (anatta).
“Seeing out of emptiness” is a specific mode of phenomenally
experiencing the world as not seen by a self-as-subject, an
ancient meditative practice, in the words of Jiddu Krishnamurti,
of “observing without an observer” (Krishnamurti, 2010).
The phenomenological reading of suññata¯ also includes a
mode of perception in which one neither adds anything to nor
takes anything away from what is present, thereby, as it were,
“directly seeing” the qualities of suchness, interrelatedness, and
impermanence. In this way, the phenomenological reading of
“emptiness” refers to a specific mode of conscious experience
that can be described as a choiceless form of pure awareness.
This mode does not involve an agentive phenomenal self,
and things are experienced neither as real nor as unreal.
Therefore, this way of seeing also bears multiple and subtle
relations to what, in Western phenomenology, has been
described as the “bracketing” of an explicit existence assumption
when philosophically investigating a specific content of
consciousness, and is associated with technical terms like epoché,
“eidetic reduction” or “phenomenological reduction” (Beyer,
2016).
Obviously, I am not saying that suññata¯ describes the
phenomenology of a standard VR user today. In VR, there is
clearly a phenomenal self, and if the place illusion has been
successfully created, the experience of actually “being there” can
be transparent and subjectively robust (Blanke and Metzinger,
2009). But the second element, the subjective experience of
an environment in VR as being “neither real nor unreal”
describes the phenomenology of VR very well. My second,
phenomenological, point is that what makes VR phenomenology
so special is the subjective quality of metaphysical indeterminacy.
The claim is that VR-phenomenology is characterized by a
phenomenology of metaphysical indeterminacy, meaning that
objects and environment in VR are subjectively experienced
as neither existing nor non-existing. Put differently, Buddhist
philosophy may actually offer the conceptual instruments to
describe the properties of interest from a more fine-grained
phenomenological perspective on what is most interesting
about an immersive VR experience. For many elements of
subjectively experienced VR, there really is a distinct phenomenal
quality of ontological neither-nor-ness: It is not the case that
subjectively experienced elements of VR are either phenomenally
real or phenomenally unreal. Phenomenologically, virtuality is
emptiness if we describe it as an explicit phenomenal experience
of metaphysical indeterminacy. I would like to submit that
this is a core aspect of what is philosophically interesting
about VR phenomenology and what distinguishes it from
ordinary waking states. It is therefore noteworthy that Buddhist
philosophymay have already given us the conceptual instruments
to describe this in a much clearer and heuristically fruitful
way.
Of course, things become much more complicated if we
include augmented reality setups, and the constantly changing
landscape and temporal distribution of phenomenal opacity
versus phenomenal transparency into our investigation.
The phenomenology of metaphysical indeterminacy is not
all-pervading, it is variable and impermanent. But one
may speculate that in the future we might, via controlled
experimentation, use VR technology itself to make progress
on philosophically relevant issues like these. For example,
one might think of “contemplative” types of VR technology
that explicitly aim at enhancing our lives by making the
phenomenal quality of metaphysical indeterminacy more
robust, then extending it to the place illusion and the sense
of self. But as we have seen, many other options are now
on the table. Perhaps the most interesting promise of VR
technology lies in supporting rational, evidence-based and
empirically informed research programs in philosophical
phenomenology, with philosophers in turn providing some
conceptual foundations and proposing novel research targets for
the VR community.
SUMMARY
As pointed out in the introduction, this article was mainly
intended to be a source of inspiration for an interdisciplinary
audience. Contact points and potential future directions for
interdisciplinary cooperation between different subdisciplines of
philosophy and VR research have been explored, through a series
of concrete examples and possible research projects. The areas
explored were:
• theories of consciousness and VR;
• embodiment and bodily self-consciousness in VR;
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• amnestic re-embodiment (in which the user is unaware of
having entered VR);
• the problem of personal identity in VR;
• rt-fMRI-NCCF (i.e., “walking around in the neural correlate
of consciousness” by a proposed new variant of real-time
fMRI-based neurofeedback employing VR technology);
• PSM-actions (i.e., novel forms of actions exclusively initiated
in the conscious self-model which causally bypass the non-
neural body);
• Complex social hallucinations and the risk of VR-induced
political apathy;
• PSBS (the new logical scenario of “postbiotic social boot-
strapping”);
• the applied ethics of VR;
• VR and the philosophy of religion;
• VR-phenomenology as a new field of research.
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